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Centre universitaire  
de médecine générale  
et santé publique · Lausanne

# Jeudi d'Unisanté - Covid-19

## Approche individuelle ou populationnelle: faut-il choisir ?

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*Jacques Cornuz*

*Collaboration: K. Selby, Y. Sancosme, C. Bondolfi, P. Bodenmann, M. Bochud*




# Plan









- Approche individuelle
- Approche populationnelle
  - Ce qui semble être efficace
  - Ce qui pourrait l'être
- Dépistages
  - Populationnel, généralisé
  - Ciblé, communautaire
- Conclusion

# Approche individuelle

- Relation médecin/cabinet – patient
  - Importance de la confiance, de la fidélité
- Proactivité des MG
- Délégation de facto aux centres de testing
- Complémentarité entre les structures individuelles, communautaires, universitaires et hospitalières




# Ranking the effectiveness of worldwide COVID-19 government interventions

Nils Haug <sup>1,2,7</sup>, Lukas Geyrhofer <sup>2,7</sup>, Alessandro Londei <sup>3</sup>, Elma Dervic <sup>1,2</sup>, Amélie Desvars-Larrive <sup>2,4</sup>, Vittorio Loreto <sup>2,3,5</sup>, Beate Pinior <sup>2,4</sup>, Stefan Thurner<sup>1,2,6</sup> and Peter Klimek <sup>1,2</sup> ✉

Assessing the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to mitigate the spread of SARS-CoV-2 is critical to inform future preparedness response plans. Here we quantify the impact of 6,068 hierarchically coded NPIs implemented in 79 territories on the effective reproduction number,  $R_e$ , of COVID-19. We propose a modelling approach that combines four computational techniques merging statistical, inference and artificial intelligence tools. We validate our findings with two external datasets recording 42,151 additional NPIs from 226 countries. Our results indicate that a suitable combination of NPIs is necessary to curb the spread of the virus. Less disruptive and costly NPIs can be as effective as more intrusive, drastic, ones (for example, a national lockdown). Using country-specific 'what-if' scenarios, we assess how the effectiveness of NPIs depends on the local context such as timing of their adoption, opening the way for forecasting the effectiveness of future interventions.

**Fig. 1: Change in  $R_t$  ( $\Delta R_t$ ) for 46 NPIs at L2, as quantified by CC analysis, LASSO and TF regression.**



## Concerns persist about purpose, ethics, and effect of rapid testing in Liverpool

| L2 category  | Score (%) | Consensus | $\Delta R_t^{CC}$ | $\Delta R_t^{LASSO}$ | Importance (RF) | $\Delta R_t^{TF}$ |
|--|-----------|-----------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| Small gathering cancellation                                 | 83        | 4         | -0.35 (2)         | -0.22 (5)            | 0.020 (2)       | -0.327 (3)        |
| Closure of educational institutions                          | 73        | 4         | -0.16 (2)         | -0.21 (4)            | 0.028 (2)       | -0.146 (2)        |
| Border restriction   | 56        | 4         | -0.23 (2)         | -0.12 (2)            | 0.017 (2)       | -0.057 (2)        |
| Increased availability of PPE                                | 51        | 4         | -0.11 (2)         | -0.13 (2)            | 0.012 (1)       | -0.062 (2)        |
| Individual movement restrictions                             | 42        | 4         | -0.13 (2)         | -0.08 (3)            | 0.017 (2)       | -0.121 (2)        |
| National lockdown  | 25        | 4         | -0.14 (3)         | -0.09 (2)            | 0.0020 (9)      | -0.008 (3)        |
| Mass gathering cancellation                                  | 53        | 3         | -0.33 (2)         | 0                    | 0.012 (1)       | -0.127 (2)        |
| Educate and actively communicate with the public             | 48        | 3         | -0.18 (4)         | 0                    | 0.018 (2)       | -0.276 (2)        |
| The government provides assistance to vulnerable populations | 41        | 3         | -0.17 (3)         | -0.18 (4)            | 0.009 (1)       | 0.090 (3)         |
| Actively communicate with managers                           | 40        | 3         | -0.15 (2)         | -0.20 (4)            | 0.004 (2)       | -0.050 (2)        |
| Measures for special populations                             | 37        | 3         | -0.19 (2)         | 0                    | 0.008 (1)       | -0.100 (2)        |
| Increase healthcare workforce                                | 35        | 3         | -0.17 (20)        | -0.13 (3)            | 0.030 (8)       | 0.011 (2)         |
| Quarantine   | 30        | 3         | -0.28 (2)         | -0.2 (1)             | 0.0023 (9)      | 0.023 (2)         |
| Activate or establish emergency response                     | 29        | 3         | -0.13 (2)         | 0                    | 0.0037 (9)      | -0.121 (2)        |
| Enhance detection system                                     | 25        | 3         | -0.19 (3)         | 0                    | 0.0032 (9)      | -0.106 (2)        |
| Increase in medical supplies and equipment                   | 25        | 3         | -0.13 (3)         | -0.004 (3)           | 0.003 (2)       | -0.200 (3)        |
| Police and army interventions                                | 23        | 3         | -0.16 (2)         | 0                    | 0.003 (2)       | -0.091 (2)        |
| Travel alert and warning                                     | 20        | 3         | -0.13 (3)         | 0.0 (1)              | 0.002 (1)       | -0.159 (3)        |
| Public transport restriction                                 | 13        | 3         | 0.020 (4)         | -0.01 (7)            | 0.004 (1)       | -0.023 (3)        |
| Actively communicate with healthcare professionals           | 11        | 3         | 0                 | -0.08 (4)            | 0.003 (1)       | -0.003 (2)        |

# Mesures les plus efficaces

- Interdiction des rassemblements publics de petite taille (< 50 personnes) : fermeture des magasins, restaurants, télétravail obligatoire
- Fermeture des institutions d'éducation
- Restriction aux frontières
- Augmentation de la disponibilité des mesures de protection personnelle (masques)
- Restriction du mouvement des personnes : couvre-feu, interdiction de déplacement pour des activités non-essentielle.

# Recommandation

**Les gouvernements doivent réaliser une pesée d'intérêt entre l'efficacité des mesures pour freiner la propagation virale et les effets négatifs des mesures les plus strictes :**

- impact de la fermeture des écoles sur l'apprentissage des élèves, leur stress et leur isolement social ;
- impact du confinement strict sur la violence domestique, notamment pour les femmes et les enfants, ou sur l'accès à des traitements importants comme les chimiothérapies.






BMJ janvier 2021

## Select pandemic strategy

## Implement pandemic strategy

## Exit path



\* **Pandemic interventions:** Border controls to “keep it out”; testing, contact tracing, case isolation and contact quarantine to “stamp it out”; improved hygiene behaviours and use of masks; physical distancing; movement restrictions; combinations including “lockdown”; vaccines; antimicrobials  
NB. There are multiple other interventions to reduce harm, including protecting vulnerable populations, reorienting health services, social and economic support

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### Actions to support use of an elimination strategy for covid-19 and future pandemic diseases

#### Institutional actions, including guidelines

- Develop a standard definition for covid-19 elimination
- Revise WHO reporting processes and standards to accurately represent the elimination status of countries, notably to distinguish imported cases from those in the community and to report if they have achieved elimination and the date this was reached
- Develop a process for review of country progress towards elimination to facilitate quarantine-free movement between countries meeting agreed standards (analogous to the verification approach applied to elimination of diseases such as polio, measles, and rubella)
- Identify conditions and infrastructure needs to support an elimination approach at national and subnational levels (for example, by state and territory in Australia)
- Develop evidence informed guidelines for approaches that countries can use to engage populations in disease elimination programmes, including partnerships with at-risk groups in strategy decision making; ensuring transparency and accountability; effective public communication
- Revise pandemic plans to reflect the role of elimination as a potential method for

responding to future severe pandemic threats, including influenza. These plans could include a typology of strategic response options (figure) and guidelines to help select an optimal approach (including exclusion strategies<sup>23</sup>)

- Establish a network of agencies to share knowledge about the elimination approach.

#### Technical and scientific actions

- Improve SARS-CoV-2 testing, notably rapid, low cost, point-of-care antigen testing
- Develop tools to support rapid contact tracing, notably digital and analytical tools that enhance manual contact tracing
- Evaluate and document case studies and methods used to achieve elimination of SARS-CoV-2 community transmission (eg, mandated mass masking)
- Analyse and evaluate optimal use of the elimination approach (relative to control options such as mitigation and suppression), notably its role in complementing future vaccination scenarios
- Conduct an integrated epidemiological and economic analysis of future pandemic management choices (figure) to guide decision making that considers wider medium and longer term health, equity, and economic effects

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# Quid du dépistage?

- But : interrompre les chaînes de transmission
- Europe : Plusieurs expériences
- CH: Souhait des autorités fédérales et cantonales
- Exigences de qualité :
  - Taux de participation – accès à bas seuil (localisation), gratuité
  - Qualité du rendu et du suivi (isoler, tracer, mise en quarantaine)
  - Périodicité du testing
  - Information – communication
  - Système de surveillance
  - Ciblé ou à très large échelle
  - Caractéristiques du test : prochain colloque !

# Quelques retours

- Été – automne : dépistage «sauvage» dans les centres de test  
Probablement env 25-30%
  - Fausse réassurance ?
  - Message: pas de feu vert si test -; par contre, si test +, feu rouge!
- Dépistage communautaire ciblé
  - Milieu carcéral
  - Ecoles, campus
  - Communes
  - Entreprises, ...

# Covid-19 dans les prisons vaudoises



Personnes privées de libertés (~ 1000 personnes) :

- 918 tests effectués du 01.10 au 11.2.21
- Taux de positivité : 9.2% (84)
  - 43 symptomatiques !
  - 41 asymptomatiques



# Covid-19 dans les prisons vaudoises



Agents de sécurité:

Indication: Si  $> 10\%$  - $15\%$  des détenus positifs =>

recommandation de la santé publique de tester tous les agents en contact

- 629 tests effectués
- Taux de positivité : 3.3% (21)

# Ecoles vaudoises

- Dépistage  $\geq 2$  cas Covid-19 (5 jours)
  - Bilan au 16.2.2021 (communication Dr E Masserey)
  - 27 classes testées(PCR salivaire)
  - Seules 4 classes en quarantaine car plusieurs testés +

# Dépistage populationnel

Dépistage de masse COVID-19 :

Quelles leçons des expériences européennes ?

- 5 villes/régions/pays sous la loupe
  - Liverpool
  - Slovaquie
  - Le Havre
  - Sud Tyrol italien
  - Canton des Grisons

**NEWS ANALYSIS**

## **Concerns persist about purpose, ethics, and effect of rapid testing in Liverpool**

The government says the city's pilot is a great success and plans to offer rapid lateral flow tests to other areas with high covid rates. But the scheme raises more questions than answers, finds **Jacqui Wise**

BMJ 5.12.2020

|   | Liverpool  | Slovaquie  | Le Havre                    | Canton des Grisons          | Sud Tyrol italien                                    |
|---|--|--|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| <b>Population cible</b>                               | ~ 490'000 habitants  | Toutes personnes éligibles : ~ 4'000'000   | ~ 270'000 habitants         | ~ 35'000 habitants          | ~ 530'000 habitants                                  |
| <b>Critères d'inclusion/exclusion</b>                 | Inclus: personnes asymptomatiques<br>Exclus: < 12 ans        | Exclusion : < 10 ans et > 65 ans<br>Quasi obligatoire : Sans test, confinement obligatoire de 10j.               | Pas de critères d'exclusion | Pas de critères d'exclusion | Inclus: personnes asymptomatiques<br>Exclus: < 5 ans |
| <b>Nombre de participants – taux de participation</b> | 189'737 individus testés (36.8 %)<br>327'496 tests effectués | 5'276'832 tests rapides effectués<br>Pilote : 87% des pers. éligibles testées.<br>Vague 1 : 83%<br>Vague 2 : 84% | 30'600 (11%)                | 15'151 (43%)                | 362'050 (65%)<br>63-70% selon les régions            |
| <b>Attitude si test +</b>                             | Isolement et traçage   | Isolement et traçage   | Isolement et traçage        | Isolement et traçage        | Isolement sans traçage                               |

Symptomatiques uniquement

Tests rapides et PCR

Outil diagnostique

5% à 35% de positifs

30'000 tests par jours en Suisse

Peu fréquent

Insuffisant pour contrôler de nouveaux clusters

Suisse en 2020

Asymptomatiques et symptomatiques

Tests rapides uniquement

Outil de dépistage

1% de positifs

Tests sur la majorité de la population cible


Fréquent (au moins 2 fois par mois)

Possiblement efficace pour contrôler de nouveaux clusters

Dépistage de masse

## Modélisations :



- Estiment que >50% des infections sont avant les symptômes ou de personnes asymptomatiques
- Suggèrent que le dépistage en masse pourrait avoir un impact important au niveau populationnel
- Par contre, demanderait :
  - un taux de participation élevé,
  - un dépistage fréquent sur une période prolongée, et
  - le maintien de mesures sanitaires permettant un taux de reproduction acceptable ( $Re < 2.5$ )




JAMA Netw Open. 2021;4(1):e2035057

N Engl J Med 2020; 383:e120 -

[https://solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/IMG-14\\_novembre\\_2020.pdf](https://solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/IMG-14_novembre_2020.pdf)







# Dépistage populationnel ciblé

The image shows the top portion of the RTS website. At the top left is the 'ma RTS' logo. To its right is a navigation menu with links for 'INFO', 'SPORT', 'CULTURE', 'PLAY RTS', 'RADIO', 'TV', 'PROGRAMME TV', 'MÉTÉO', and 'PLUS'. On the far right of this menu is a search bar with a magnifying glass icon and the text 'RECHERCHER'. Below this is a red horizontal bar containing the 'RTS Info' logo in the center. Underneath the red bar is a secondary navigation bar with links for 'INFO', 'EMISSIONS', 'PODCASTS', 'CORONAVIRUS', 'SUISSE', 'MONDE', 'ECONOMIE', and 'PLUS'. A search bar with a magnifying glass icon and the text 'Rechercher' is located on the right side of this bar.

Vaud Publié hier à 13:58



## Le résultat du dépistage de masse dans les Alpes vaudoises est rassurant

Le canton de Vaud a tiré un bilan rassurant des tests de dépistage à large échelle organisés dans les stations de Villars, des Diablerets et de Leysin. Les quelque 2600 tests effectués ont permis de déceler environ 1% de cas positifs, dont un quart d'asymptomatiques.

Samedi soir à 19 heures, après la fermeture du dernier lieu de prélèvement à Leysin, 2659 personnes s'étaient rendues dans les trois centres pour passer un test rapide. Ceux-ci ont permis de détecter 26 personnes positives, soit 0,98% du total, un bilan rassurant, estime le canton dans un communiqué publié samedi soir.

Dans le détail, 1147 tests ont été menés à Villars, dont 23 positifs (1,97%), 599 tests aux Diablerets, dont un positif (0,17%) et 913 à Leysin, dont deux positifs (0,22%). Parmi les 26 personnes contaminées par le Covid-19, un quart ne présentaient pas de symptômes. Leur part correspond à ce qui a été constaté lors d'opérations similaires ailleurs en Suisse et en Europe.

# Etudiant.es FBM: Pratique médicale communautaire



Pour les trois derniers jours à Leysin, une trentaine d'étudiantes et étudiants en médecine de cinquième année ont été engagés par Unisanté dans le cadre de leur formation en médecine communautaire. La suite donnée à cette phase pilote fera l'objet d'une évaluation et d'une décision prochaine du Conseil d'Etat vaudois.

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## Merci de votre attention

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